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Abstract 
 
In this essay, we ask whether leadership development needs to care more about neuro-
ethics in an era when neuroscientific interventions gain credence at work? Informed 
by emerging discussions amongst neuroscientists, we address two main issues. First, 
recent debates cast significant doubt on the validity of neurofeedback (especially 
neurofeedback using electroencephalography). These studies argue instead that it 
works through placebo rather than real effects. Second, further ethical concerns arise 
in response to (i) questionable commercial practice, (ii) issues of organizational 
in/justice and (iii) tendencies to ignore or downplay practical wisdom. Our discussion 
incites us to be both critical of neuro-feedback’s scientistic credentials and aware of 
its broader historical conditions of possibility. We complement these cautions with a 
call to action for leader development researchers and practitioners.  
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Does leadership development need to care about neuro-ethics? Bearing in mind that 
neuro-ethics is “concerned with ethical, legal and social policy implications of 
neuroscience” (Illes & Bird, 2006, p. 511), we are motivated to ask this question for 
two reasons.  
First, a growing number of leadership development researchers and 
practitioners are enthusiastic about the promises of neurofeedback, especially that 
based upon electroencephalography (EEG-nf). Neurofeedback constitutes a self-
regulation technique providing individuals with feedback about specific levels of 
brain activity in conjunction with specific target behaviors (see the 'primer' in the 
Appendix, but also Balthazard, 2011; Rock & Schwartz, 2006; Waldman, Wang, 
Hannah, & Balthazard, 2016; Waldman, Balthazard, & Peterson, 2011). As a relevant 
example, prior studies (see Waldman et al., 2011) suggest that the use of 
neurofeedback putatively enabled researchers to convert un-inspirational leaders (i.e., 
the less effective ones with an ‘anger management’ problem) into inspirational ones 
(i.e., those who are more effective)1. And yet, we must ask what the consequences are 
for leadership development if neuroscientists flag up serious reservations about the 
validity of EEG-nf? For instance, neuroscientists such as Thibault and Raz (Thibault, 
Lifshitz, Birbaumer, & Raz, 2015; Thibault, Lifshitz, & Raz, 2016; Thibault & Raz, 
2016a, b, in press) express serious doubts about the validity of data derived from 
EEG-nf, arguing that the majority of studies fail to adequately design experiments 
capable of singling out the unique variance that EEG-nf can explain. In consequence, 
they conclude it is highly likely that the observed effects in EEG-nf studies are due to 
placebo effects.  
                                                
1 Beyond the problems highlighted in the following sentences, we also note the significant weaknesses 
in the design of that study that adversely impinge upon the validity of the conclusions (see Lindebaum, 
2013b, for a detailed treatment of this).  
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We contend that this raises significant questions about the ethical and practical 
ramifications for leadership development if questionable data is treated as superior or 
more valid in comparison with traditional modes of data. This position is regularly 
invoked by advocates of neuroscience. For instance, leadership development projects 
seeking to harness purportedly ‘better’ predictions derived from neuroscience argue 
that “neurofeedback approaches to develop better leaders” have great promise as 
“traditional measures [e.g., of leadership] explain only 10% of variance in outcomes” 
(Waldman, Wang, & Fenters, 2016: 12), or that “leadership neuroscience could help 
leaders hone certain skills or improve in areas where they are weak” (Balthazard, 
2011).  
Second, beyond these epistemological challenges posed by neurofeedback, we 
also ask whether there are ethical challenges, yet to be articulated, arising in response 
to the application of EEG-nf for enhancement (in the context of leadership 
development) rather than clinical purposes? We ask this question as a follow-up to 
Lindebaum’s (2016: 544) remark that there “is little – if any – deeper conversation 
about the ethics of neuroscience as such among advocates of organizational 
neuroscience, especially if neuroscience is applied to emotional or cognitive 
enhancing in healthy individuals rather than clinical purposes”.  
In this essay, we draw upon recent debates in neuroscientific and 
psychological journals to draw the attention of leadership development researchers 
and practitioners to the validity issues afflicting EEG-nf (Thibault & Raz, 2016a, b, in 
press). Furthermore, we discuss a number of ethical concerns arising from the 
considerable commercial interests kindled by EEG-nf technologies and from the 
potential erosion of organizational justice and practical wisdom that are likely to 
follow EEG-nf’s unreflexive adoption. 
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We note that ethical concerns are further magnified once we see how the 
validity issues inherent in EEG-nf have not yet lowered the putative appeal of better 
predictions provided by neuroscience. Such a situation helps create a considerable 
market and training industry around ‘brain fitness’ and enhancement (Underwood, 
2016)2. For instance, prospective leaders can enjoy an intensive brain-training retreat 
for a mere $15,000, and the whole ‘brain fitness’ market is expected to grow to $6 
billion by 2020 according to some news articles (Alsever, 2015; but see also Simons 
et al., 2016). Even within business schools, neuroscience-based executive education 
programs are now being offered3. Thus, ethical issues can arise when “efforts to 
commercialize neuroscience . . . frequently outpace[d] the underlying science” 
(Ashkanasy, Becker, & Waldman, 2014: 909). Nevertheless, organizations keen for 
quick fixes concerning organizational capability and behavior in increasingly complex 
and dynamic settings may find the alleged benefits too appealing to question due to 
lack of necessary ‘neuroliteracy’ on the topic (Roskies, 2002).  
In the remainder of this essay, we address the following points. First, we offer 
a brief overview on the topic of neuro-ethics, noting its prosperity as a dedicated 
subfield within neuroscience (Fuchs, 2006; Illes & Bird, 2006; Illes, Tairyan, 
Federico, Tabet, & Glover, 2010; Kalichman, Plemmons, & Bird, 2012; Levy, 2008, 
2011). Our motivation is to highlight the significant ethical and practical questions 
this discipline raises. Second, we underline the relevance of these debates for 
leadership development, especially in relation to ethical concerns arising from the 
applications of data whose validity has been called into question by neuroscientists 
                                                
2 We do see EEG-nf as one tool in the pool of ‘brain training’ technologies where commercial interests 
run high. For instance, Balthazard (2011) notes that “the concept has been proven”, adding that “now 
we have to go beyond the proof of concept into operationalization. Then, we will move into the 
delivery of products and services”. 
3 See, for example: http://executive.mit.edu/openenrollment/program/neuroscience-for-
leadership/#.V4I3aPOV9gU  or  http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/execed/program-
pages/details/1026/POIPd  (both retrieved on the 10th of May 2017). 
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themselves. Third, we extend prior critiques to identify as-yet underexplored ethical 
challenges. And fourth, we draw this essay to a close with a pro-tem vote of no 
confidence in the scientific credential of EEG-nf, followed by a call for action (i) not 
to be blindly seduced by neuroscience’s promise of producing better and more 
reliable data, (ii) to focus upon alternatives to the seductive appeal of neuroscience 
that are more viable in relation to leader development, and (iii) to develop greater 
sensitivity about the teleology of the ‘enhancement’ agenda at work of which 
neuroscience is now a central component. Although we frame our essay around the 
theme of leader development, we believe that a broad community of stakeholders is 
likely to have an interest in the arguments presented here, including individuals in 
organizations, management scholars, leaders concerned with sustainable 
organizational development, organizational development practitioners, and those 
stakeholders with concerns about the impact and influence of organizational practices 
across various sectors (e.g., public, private and non-for-profit) on society.  
 
Neuro-ethics: a brief overview 
The concept of neuro-ethics is polysemic as it refers both to the ethics of neuroscience 
and to the neuroscience of ethics (Roskies, 2002). Our essay focuses exclusively, 
however, on the ethics of neuroscience as we examine the ethical problems arising 
from the application of neurofeedback (especially in the context of EEG-nf) to 
leadership development. By contrast, the neuroscience of ethics is concerned with the 
neurobiology of moral and ethical thinking and decision making, how intuitions are 
generated, and how individuals form judgments that specify which courses of action 
are prohibited, permissible, or even obligatory (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Levy, 
2011). While these studies are interesting in their own right – and bring their own 
problems and interrogations – they are not directly relevant to the present argument. 
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On a more generic level, advances in neuroscience continue to shape our 
understanding of the brain and can provide new ways to take advantage of that 
understanding according to some scholars (Kalichman et al., 2012). These changes 
are set to profoundly alter societies and the people who live in them, not only in terms 
of curing brain-related diseases, but also in terms of how neuroscience can be enlisted 
to boost cognitive capabilities of workers in a competitive marketplace through the 
application of technology or drugs (Harari, 2014; Lindebaum, 2013b; Sahakian & 
Morein-Zamir, 2007; Wastell & White 2017). While these fast, deep, and social 
transformations are presented in an unquestionably positive way by the commercial 
actors who promote them (as highlighted by Thibault & Raz, in press), they also raise 
significant neuro-ethical questions for organizations and societies, especially in terms 
of the technology leads to a concentrated distribution and access to power. If the logic 
of advocates is followed that ‘brains can be boosted’, Wastell and White (2017) 
maintain that “contestable choices are being made about who to help, who needs to 
change and how many is spent on creating a better world” (p. ix).  
Indeed, as our understanding of brain functioning advances, we are prompted 
to revisit significant “philosophical questions about free will, responsibility, identity, 
and the nature of consciousness” (Chan & Harris, 2011: 77). Although these are time-
honored questions, neuroscience imposes the need to re-engage with them and 
consider them in a new light. Not only in their own right, but even more pressingly in 
the context of using neuroscience to inform management practice. In this respect, it 
has been documented that the issues identified above by Chan and Harris (2011) have 
been largely ignored in the context of management (Lindebaum, 2013a, b, 2016), with 
far-reaching social implications. For instance, if leaders begin to constitute 
themselves and their followers as ‘neurological subjects’ (Chan & Harris, 2011), this 
will shift perceptions of leadership towards a more “biologized” version, embodied 
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brains separate from the complex social systems that they inhabit (Cunningham-
Burley, 2010). This, in turn, is bound to affect our understanding of ourselves as well 
as ongoing relationships we have with others (for a discussion what that means for 
leadership developmnet, see Lindebaum, 2013b). 
Overall, the advance of neuroscience will not impact solely upon the 
neuroscientific community, but also upon diverse groups and members of society 
(Kalichman et al., 2012; Wastell & White 2017). It raises, inter alia, questions about 
power and access to resources the moment the public succumbs unquestioningly to 
the idea that they must subscribe to neuro-enhancement (either through drugs or 
technology) to remain ahead of others in the quest for, or preservation of, highly-paid 
knowledge work (Harari, 2014).4 
In light of these issues, we find claims to the effect that “without the 
appropriate application of cognitive neuroscience, organizational science will find it 
far more difficult to advance at the same rapid rate that it has over the past century” 
(Lee, Senior, & Butler, 2012: 922) premature at best, if not entirely misguided. Since 
when, we submit, has the need for more ‘speed’ in knowledge production been a 
harbinger of quality knowledge? It is ironic that advocates of neuroscience in 
management are concerned with speed in the theoretical and empirical foundations of 
their field, while neuroscientists themselves continue to grapple with, and raise 
fundamental (and lingering) questions about, theoretical foundations of neuroscience, 
and the validity of the data produced (e.g., Button et al., 2013; Jonas & Kording, 
2016; Simons et al., 2016; Thibault & Raz, in press).  
 
 
                                                
4 For a first-hand account, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/item/b4e29767-f9b8-4cd1-b19e-
ae3b5f158035  , accessed on the 7th of December 2016 
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Neurofeedback and leader development 
Great expectations are raised when scholars ask whether we can “revolutionize the 
way that inspirational leaders are identified and developed” (Waldman et al., 2011, p. 
60, italics added). In their study of 50 business executives, Waldman and colleagues 
used data generated by quantitative electroencephalography (qEEG) in combination 
with an appraisal of vision statements and traditional leadership questionnaires 
(2011a). As a mode of assessment, qEEG employs advanced signaling processing 
techniques to retrieve data about brain activity through the skull and scalp. To this 
end, several electrodes are placed at specified locations on the scalp (see Waldman et 
al.’s article for more information). In terms of study design, while participants 
underwent the qEEG examination, they were asked to engage in a vision task, which 
these scholars claim to be a typical activity that characterizes inspirational leadership. 
Waldman and colleagues collected perceptions of inspirational leadership by way of a 
questionnaire survey from three to six direct reports of each executive. Findings 
indicate seemingly distinct activities in the right frontal brain region that reputedly 
sets inspirational leaders apart from those who are not. They also move on to apply 
their ideas to developing leaders, a central question for scholars interested in 
management learning (Antonakis, Fenley, & Liechti, 2011).  
As a result of the presumed benefits of EEG-nf, the appeal for both 
researchers and practitioners resides in the assumption that we can understand the 
neurobiological mechanisms as well as the therapeutic potential of this approach. In 
the interim, EEG-nf has morphed into an industrious clinical field, which features 
international accreditation boards, specialized academic journals, and over a thousand 
practitioners (Thibault et al., 2015). Despite the widespread use of EEG-nf among 
researchers, specialty clinics, and private institutions in relation to a variety of 
disorders and impairments (Thibault et al., 2016) and, more recently, cognitive 
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enhancements (Gruzelier, 2014), recent systematic reviews in the neuroscientific 
literature have largely dismissed the effects of EEG-nf as “placebo-driven” (Thibault 
et al., 2016, p. 248). More precisely, it has been claimed that, although the potential of 
EEG-nf as an alternative form of medical treatment is not entirely denied, “mounting 
evidence refutes the clinical superiority of feedback training over sham treatment” 
(see Thibault et al., 2016, for cited studies to this effect)5.  
Of note, the authors warn that the gold standard across medical research 
domains, namely, double-blind sham-controlled studies, are conspicuously absent in 
the case of clinical EEG-nf studies. The extent of this deficiency is such that Thibault 
and colleagues could only identify one sham-controlled, double-blind EEG-based 
neurofeedback study demonstrating clinical superiority of veridical over sham 
feedback following a literature search (see Thibault & Raz, 2016b, for details). 
Whereas advocates of EEG-nf continue to tout the effectiveness thereof for treating a 
variety of psychological and neurological disorders (Arns, Heinrich, & Strehl, 2014; 
Cannon, 2015), Thibault and colleagues argue that “it appears that influences other 
than the feedback itself bring about improvements in clinical endpoints across a range 
of disorders” (Thibault et al., 2016, p. 249, italics added). These scholars make 
explicit reference to psychological factors, such as participant motivation, 
administrator-patient interactions, or client confidence in technology in this regard 
(Thibault & Raz, 2016b). This observation has direct bearings upon how we study the 
process of learning at work. As scholars have recently repeated, “greater attention 
[should] be given to the forms of social interaction and the context in which learning 
takes place” (Cajiao & Burke, 2016: 509). We elaborate upon the significance of this 
                                                
5 ‘Sham’ treatment refers to “feedback not derived from the participant's brain activity. Or, feedback 
derived from the participant's brain, but not from the region or frequency of interest” (Thibault et al., 
2016). It is also the case that researchers sometimes provide random feedback, or feedback garnered 
from a previous trial with a different participant. 
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reference to ‘psychological’ mechanisms (which produce the placebo effects) for 
leadership development in the ‘call to action’ section. However, if the authors are 
correct in their conclusions, it should be clear that there are fundamental problems 
with this type of intervention in terms of its validity. This, in turn, entails critical 
theoretical and practical implications for leadership development scholars.  
Theoretically, in the hope to generate new theories or theoretical insights as a 
direct consequence of using EEG-nf, researchers must be keenly aware of this likely 
limitation. Given the probable invalidity of the effects detected by EEG-nf, there is a 
risk of theory contamination. To understand this argument, it is worth revisiting 
Horkheimer’s (1937/1976) point that the validity of a theory is dependent upon 
propositions being consonant with actual facts. In the presence of a contradiction 
between theory and data, both must be re-examined, since either the data are wrong, 
or the principles of the theory are inaccurate. In relation to EEG-nf and the (as yet 
unsupported) assumption about its validity, this implies that any contradiction 
between the data and theory would prompt a scrutiny of the theoretical principles, 
rather than the actual cause of the contradiction (i.e. the data generated by EEG-nf).  
By taking for granted the relevance of data gathered through EEG-nf, 
researchers engage in a sloppy research avenue for two reasons. First, researchers rely 
on unwarranted data to advance theories of human behavior in general and of 
leadership in particular. While reliable data do not guarantee good theory, it is unclear 
how unreliable data can help produce better theory. We also submit that revisiting the 
whole theory is usually more onerous than questioning the data, so most researchers 
will question the data before questioning the theory. And second, leadership 
development researchers enthusiastic about EEG-nf approaches run the risk of failing 
to question their own theories precisely because they assume that EEG-nf provides 
more robust data than traditional sources of information, such as data based upon 
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questionnaires, interviews, observation or ethnography. The willingness to engage in 
this research avenue, in light of recent systematic reviews such as those provided by 
Raz and Thibault (2016b, in press), brings to question the epistemological, but also 
the ethical, integrity of such studies. Equally alarming, this sloppy research avenue is 
also a recipe for the bad management practice which often follows bad management 
theory (Ghoshal, (2005).  
A practical example can help us appreciate how bad management practice can 
emerge if data that are considered superior are, in fact, not. Drawing upon Waldman 
and colleagues (2011), they report the following intervention story: 
“As a case example, one of our participants was a manager who 
reported anger management problems. Obviously, someone with 
such issues might be challenged when assuming a leadership role, 
as emotional equanimity is an important quality. It is hard to 
imagine that anyone in a leadership position who “flies off the 
handle” could be seen as inspirational. With the help of a 
neurotherapist, we were able to pinpoint the root cause of the 
behavior, which as it turns out could be traced to a childhood 
baseball injury. This injury had affected a portion of the brain 
particularly relevant to an individual’s emotional stability, 
especially with regard to anger issues. Based on knowledge gained 
through prior qEEG research dealing with the neurological basis of 
anger management problems . . . with a series of neurofeedback 
sessions, the individual was able to rearrange neuropathways in the 
affected area, create new pathways with healthy neighboring 
neurons, and largely correct the problem. Accordingly, he was able 
to set the stage to become a more effective leader” (p. 69). 
 
This vignette, which the authors refer to a ‘case example’, highlights what they see as 
the ultimate goal “to be able to assess leadership potential via neuroscience 
technology, and then use neurofeedback to more directly develop the neurological 
wiring associated with effective leadership behaviors” (Waldman et al., 2011, p. 69). 
We contend that this suggestion is premature due to the limitations of neurofeedback 
(as discussed), as well as the portrayal of the angry manager as inherently bad. Recent 
debates have conceptually highlighted the cost of collapsing together all kinds of 
 	 12	
anger while applying the universal (and misguided) perception that all expressions of 
anger constitute a ‘problem’. This is because such an approach suppresses the 
informational and energic value of what has been termed ‘moral anger’, such that 
appraisals of moral transgressions (i.e., informational value) and sustaining one’s 
willingness to take corrective action (i.e., energic value) can be diminished 
(Lindebaum & Gabriel, 2016). With this possibility in mind, what ostensibly appears 
like a ‘success’ story in the vignette above may, on closer inspection, turn out rather 
detrimental to workplaces. As Lindebaum and Garbriel (2016) note, “a world without 
anger would be, possibly, a compliant and quiescent world but not a just world” (p. 
903).  
 
ETHICS BEYOND PROBLEMATIC DATA 
In addition to our concerns relative to unreflexive reliance on disputable data (see 
above), we are concerned about ethical questions that arise as a result of questionable 
commercial practices, but also of EEG-nf’s potential to degrade organizational justice 
and to erode or marginalize practical wisdom. To these questions, we now turn.  
 
Questionable commercial practices? 
The first, and perhaps most obvious, ethical question raised by neurofeedback relates 
to the commercial ethics of this lucrative enterprise. The scientific credentials of the 
‘neuro’ in neuro-feedback make the practice more appealing than others based upon 
other forms of feedback (a brain scan shouts 'science' after all, see Wastell & White 
2012). Advocates claim that “the concept has been proven” and that “now we have to 
go beyond the proof of concept into operationalization. Then, we will move into the 
delivery of products and services” very soon (Balthazard, 2011). Indeed, a Neurotech 
index has been listed on Nasdaq since 2007, enabling an unprecedented 
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commercialization of brain related products6. However, in a forthcoming article, 
Thibault and Raz (in press: 33) point out the possibility of dominant business interests 
in the use and proliferation of EEG-nf technology in specialist clinics, noting that 
“whereas the published literature may paint a semi-rigorous and scholarly image of 
EEG-nf, under this superficial veneer flourish strong business agendas largely 
incongruent with the standards of academic investigation and medical research”. They 
go on to describe a meeting with a representative of a non-profit international 
neurofeedback organization, in which the representative “scoffed at the idea that the 
International Society for Neurofeedback and Research consists of academic 
researchers” (p. 33).  
In addition, there are also ominous signs emerging that consumers who are 
prompted to purchase a service according to what is ‘on the tin’ may not be getting 
what they expected. For instance, the recent ruling by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) in the US against ‘Lumosity’ firmly underlines this point. The firm has to pay 
$2 million to settle FTC deceptive advertising charges for its “Brain Training” 
programme. This product alleged to boost performance in everyday life and safeguard 
against cognitive decline7. Taking together the above example as well as the validity 
issues afflicting neuroscientific data or interventions, it is central to recognize the 
ethical dimensions here, as unreliable research is useless and wasteful (Button et al., 
2013). In addition, even if it has been argued that EEG-nf works (through placebo, but 
not real effects) as a clinical intervention, would it be ethical to charge up to $10,000 
for a standard programme (see Thibault & Raz, in press) if there is no specific 
neurological effect behind the intervention? 
                                                
6 Retrieved from http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=265676   on 17th of May 2017.  
7 Retrieved from https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/lumosity-pay-2-million-
settle-ftc-deceptive-advertising-charges  on the 22nd of June 2016.  
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Compromising organizational justice 
It would be a dangerous fantasy to imagine that leadership development based upon 
neurofeedback is confined to the laboratory and bears no effect on what goes on in the 
workplace, especially when the fees are paid by employers8. A more reasonable view 
is that, in the absence of normative conventions stating otherwise, organizations 
paying $15,000 for each of their prospective leaders’ intensive brain-training retreat 
will also expect full access to the ‘results’ and ‘scores’ of their employees (for a 
discussion of power and conventions, see Al-Amoudi & Latsis, 2014). Not only will 
corporate clients seek to access the results, but they will also seek to use the data 
collected from neurofeedback sessions to inform the myriad organizational 
procedures through which employees are scored and compared, and through which 
they make decisions affecting employees’ careers (Lindebaum, 2013b).  
Most organizations already rely on personnel management systems based on 
quantitative performance indicators. The results of EEG-nf can easily become central 
within broader decision-making processes for two reasons. First, because they appear 
to provide precise quantifiable data (relevance and robustness are, as we have seen, 
minor concerns). And second, because the scientistic assumptions at the origins of 
neurofeedback’s appeal are likely to make such use of the data quite uncontestable 
within the organization. The use of presumably uncontestable data generated through 
EEG-nf is likely to complicate attempts to resist organizational change, even when the 
latter is detrimental to the organization and/or the lives of its members (see 
Courpasson, Dany, & Clegg, 2011, on productive resistance). Sceptics might raise the 
objection that neuroscience does not play a role yet in performance management 
                                                
8 A more circumspect scholar recently suggested - in a private conversation with one of the authors – 
that the organisation involved in his/her research project on the neurological basis of decision –making 
was eager to use the data obtained for promotion and intervention purposes. Expectations had to be 
managed so as to clarify that the data is not suitable (yet) to for such use.  
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appraisals. However, a recent report by the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
Development (CIPD, 2014) in the UK argues otherwise, suggesting that 
“neuroscience also has application to reward, performance management, and even 
marketing and customer strategy” (p. 30, and see also footnote 8).  
From a superficially scientistic perspective, reliance upon neurofeedback data 
for career promotion (or firing) decisions can be viewed as a positive step for 
organizational justice, which is “concerned with the ways in which employees 
determine if they have been treated fairly in their jobs and the ways in which those 
determinations influence other work-related variables” (Moorman, 1991, p. 845). As 
the common belief goes, both justice and perceptions of justice should be improved 
whenever subjective, and presumably fallible and partial, appreciation by peers and 
line-managers is replaced by presumably less fallible and partial objective data 
gathered by a ‘third party’ and through state-of-the-art technology.  
Problems arise, however, whenever approaches based on EEG-nf fall short of 
attaining the impartiality or infallibility claimed by their advocates. In these respects, 
the lack of validity of EEG-nf is problematic for organizational justice, which is 
compromised whenever data informing the distribution of resources are known to be 
irrelevant or otherwise unreliable. For instance, some individuals may be singled out, 
on the basis of EEG-nf tests, as not being sufficiently ‘inspirational’ for their 
organization, and hence not sufficiently effective if one accepts the logics of previous 
studies (Waldman et al. 2011, but see also Knippenberg & Sitkin 2013 for a strong 
critique of inspirational/transformational leadership). We are concerned about the 
implicit and unquestioned privileging of some leadership traits over others, as such 
discrimination can constitute a clash with concerns for organizational injustice. And 
we feel all the more concerned when these traits are reflected in neurofeedback data 
which are probably invalid and, therefore, are very loosely related to performance or 
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development. Our point, therefore, highlights the need for a public discussion about 
which behaviors deserve being developed to suit the needs of specific circumstances, 
and whether these are can be developed through EEG-nf or not.  
Furthermore, organizational justice is compromised whenever neurological 
data minimizes the importance of actual behaviors and accomplishments. A manager 
who is respected by her peers and who led her team to accomplish commendable 
projects is likely to be penalized if her brain signals do not fit the patterns attributed to 
leadership. In other words, organizational justice is compromised by a reification and 
fetishisation of brain signals assumed to be as, if not more, relevant than the actions of 
an employee and the opinions of her colleagues. 
 
Downplaying practical wisdom 
The above considerations about the potential of EEG-nf to minimize the significance 
of accomplishments and peer opinion is indicative of neurofeedback’s (and more 
generally neuroscience’s) inability to account for subtle, complex and highly context-
dependent considerations when evaluating leadership potential. But EEG-nf’s 
blindness to what is subtle, complex and context-dependent does not only mean that it 
cannot form subtle, complex and context-dependent judgments. It also means that it 
cannot appreciate it or measure it, let alone train it. 
And yet, the capacity to form complex, subtle and context-dependent 
judgments has been examined and discussed throughout a long tradition of 
scholarship, albeit one that leaves little room for as crude approaches as EEG-nf. 
Almost 24 centuries ago, Aristotle identified the importance of practical wisdom (or 
phronesis) both as a virtue and as a mark of leadership. Practical wisdom is, 
according to him:  
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“a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with 
regard to the things that are good or bad for man 
… It is for this reason that we think Pericles and 
men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because 
they can see what is good for themselves and what 
is good for men in general; we consider that those 
can do this who are good at managing households 
or states”. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI)9 
 
The importance of phronesis for leadership has not escaped the attention of 
contemporary leadership scholars. Indeed, in the pages of this very journal, Shotter 
and Tsoukas (2014) proposed that phronetic leaders “are people who, in their search 
for a way out of their difficulties, have developed a refined capacity to intuitively 
grasp salient features of ambiguous situations and to constitute a "landscape" of 
possible paths of response, while driven by the pursuit of the notion of the common 
good” (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014, p. 224). 
And yet, practical wisdom also confronts advocates of neurofeedback with an 
insuperable conundrum: what evidence do we have that a faculty trained in the 
laboratory will then be wisely mobilized in a real-life situation, unless we suppose 
that subjects have already developed their practical wisdom? Hence, practical 
wisdom, or phronesis, seems at once a human faculty that is untestable by 
neurofeedback and one that is necessary for improvements in the laboratory to bear 
any significance in the workplace. This incapacity to grasp phronesis is ethically 
problematic for leadership development programmes based on EEG-nf. Firstly, 
because they promise to train leadership skills while ignoring the skill which is 
perhaps the most important of all. And secondly, because phronesis is, as Aristotle 
rightly remarked, not merely a skill but also a moral virtue that is necessary for the 
                                                
9 Retrieved from http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.6.vi.html  - on the 24th of January 2017.  
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identification and pursuit of the common good. Forms of leadership training that 
ignore or downplay phronesis are, therefore, liable to foster attitudes that are 
detrimental to organizational efficiency but also to the collective pursuit of the 
common good.  
 
SO WHAT? A PRO-TEM VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE AND CALL TO 
ACTION 
Having identified both the deficiencies in appreciating neuro-ethics in research and 
practice around leadership development (and beyond), and the inherent validity issues 
afflicting EEG-nf, we are now in a position to cast a pro-tem vote of no confidence 
against leadership development and practices informed by EEG-nf. But our vote of no 
confidence has to be pro-tem for two reasons. Firstly, we remain aware of the ultimate 
need to have the result obtained through the systematic literature reviews upon which 
we draw here (Thibault et al., 2015; Thibault et al., 2016; Thibault & Raz, in press) 
confirmed through meta-analytical studies. However, unless the arguments by 
neuroscientists and us are refuted, scientific rigor commands skepticism rather than 
enthusiasm. Secondly, our vote of no confidence is pro-tem because our point is less 
to discourage research at the intersection of neuroscience and management than to 
discourage premature triumphalism. Thus, we wish to encourage reflexivity and 
critical awareness in management learning and leadership development studies about 
the pitfalls of relying upon data with questionable validity. Our vote of no confidence 
is, therefore, followed by a call for action to inform future debates and research. 
Below we pay particular heed to the following points. First, we underscore the need 
not to be ‘seduced’ by the putative benefits of neuroscience (e.g., more valid and 
reliable data or interventions) in relation to leader development research and practice. 
Second, vis-à-vis the caution that the effects of EEG-nf are likely placebo-driven as 
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opposed to being driven by neuroscientific interventions as such, we advocate a return 
to more psychologically-driven interventions. Third, by re-visiting Habermasian 
thought on the prehistory of modern positivism, we wish to call upon readers to 
engage with greater scrutiny and reflection in the emerging debate on organizational 
neuroscience as applied to leader development. Our aim is to encourage a clearer 
historical understanding of what is being done here, and why? And with what 
consequences for the workplace? We elaborate on these arguments below.  
 
Avoid seduction by neuroscientific data 
The seductive potential of neuroscience in informing management research and 
practice implies a crucial need to develop more acute neuro-literacy (see Roskies, 
2002) amongst scholars and practitioners in order to prevent the undesirable 
consequences for management learning, including leader development (Lindebaum, 
2013b). Other fields, such as family policy, have already documented the severe 
consequences for families and children if questionable neuroscience research starts to 
inform policies in a given domain (e.g., promoting early neuroscientific interventions 
to improve the lives of children, see Wastell & White 2012, 2017). Likewise, funding 
agencies of interdisciplinary research need to be aware about the conceptual and 
methodological limitations of neuroscience as applied in leader development and 
beyond. They may not obtain the benefits promised in research grant application if 
these are not sufficiently sensitive to the limitations of neuroscience. Recall that 
unreliable research is not efficient and squanders valuable resources (Button et al., 
2013). Ghoshal (2005) would add here the element of harm, for as long as social 
scientists hide ideology in the pretense of science, there is the potential of much 
damage being done to individuals and groups within organization. More specifically, 
he argued that the combination of a ‘pretense of knowledge’, together with an 
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‘ideology-based gloomy vision’, fosters the adoption of excessive truth claims rooted 
on partial analysis and unbalanced assumptions. Crucially, for the pretense of 
knowledge to obtain legitimacy in management studies and beyond, theorizing must 
be value-free and, worse still, entails a dismissal of ethical concerns (Suddaby, 2014). 
Therefore, we argue that leader development needs to become clearer and 
more transparent about the ethical ramifications which ensue from its practical 
interventions. Put differently, there is a need to examine more systematically our own 
ethical standards, and that of the organizations we collaborate with vis-à-vis their 
financial interests (for details, see Thibault & Raz, in press; Underwood, 2016) to 
better understand the role that neuroscience can, should, or should not play in the 
decisions we make about leader development interventions. A greater focus on neuro-
ethics as advocated here will be integral to limiting any adverse ethical, legal, and 
social policy implications resulting from the application of neuroscience at work. This 
is a highly sensitive issue; it is well established that placebo effects are regularly used 
for clinical purposes as physicians seeks to generate a therapeutic effect in a patient 
(Lichtenberg, Heresco-Levy, & Nitzan, 2004). Yet, it is fair to assume that this 
therapeutic effect might be challenged if the general public is sufficiently informed 
about the placebo effect of a particular drug or intervention. However, that therapeutic 
justification is abandoned if leadership researchers and practitioners move into 
enhancement applications. While here the effects of EEG-nf would also vanish once 
the general public is sufficiently informed about its probable underlying placebo 
effect, there is an added complexity; a public outcry is not unlikely – especially in 
times of news going ‘viral’ - about the fact that under the pretense of ‘science’, vested 
commercial interests are thriving (Thibault & Raz, in press; Underwood, 2016). The 
net damage is far greater than pinpointing questionable data within specific scientific 
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disciplines; it has the unintended consequences that the public’s trust in science 
overall is compromised.  
 
Return to psychologically-driven interventions 
In terms of interventions based upon EEG-nf, we suggest that there are insufficient 
grounds yet for ‘psychological’ factors in leader development to be superseded with 
interventions based upon neuroscientific ones, such as EEG-based neurofeedback10. 
In this respect, Thibault and Raz (2016b, p. 497) assert that “relevant studies seldom 
show that receiving neurofeedback . . . constitutes a necessary component for 
attaining the supposed benefits”, adding that “psychosocial factors (e.g., expectation 
and motivation), rather than neurophysiological parameters, may mediate the reported 
clinical improvement”. Like others (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004), we thus argue that a 
variety of psychological factors likely contribute to the outcome of management 
learning. In fact, we note that these psychological factors can themselves have an 
impact upon the brain. For instance, Pascual-Leone and colleagues (2005) describe 
how “mental practice alone may be sufficient to promote the plastic modulation of 
neural circuits” (p. 380) following an experiment which demonstrated the biological 
impact of visualization on the brain. This is because mental simulations of movements 
activate some of the same central neural structures involved in the performance of the 
actual movements (for more evidence, see Decety, 1996). Building upon this, we 
contend that the benefits of addressing leader development by way of neuroscientific 
                                                
10 However, we note that the uncritical application of psychological research has been a feature of, for 
instance, business coaching (see, e.g., Blackman, Moscardo, & Gray, 2016). Although the cited study 
ascertained converging factors contributing to the effectiveness of business coaching, it also notes that 
“determining the primary beneficiaries of coaching, the factors that contribute to coach credibility, and 
how the organizational and social context impacts on coaching” in addition to “weaknesses in coaching 
research methodology” are all issues to be addressed in future research (Blackman et al., 2016: 459). 
At the same time, we refer to prior studies on the ethics of neuroscience which highlighted why 
neuroscientific data can raises different kinds of ethical liabilities compared to standard psychological 
testing, such as personality tests or IQ testing (Lindebaum, 2013b).  
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interventions are not outweighed by side-lining psychological interventions – that, in 
fact, the addition of neuroscientific ‘knowledge’ to an intervention may ultimately 
contribute less to an intervention than psychological factors. For instance, we wonder 
whether the ‘angry manager’ (as referred to in Waldman et al., 2011) could have also 
changed his/her behavior through a focus on psychological processes? Considering 
recent intervention studies on cognitive re-appraisal, we respond in the affirmative. 
Denny and Ochsner (2014) report that individuals were able to learn to regulate (i.e., 
to cognitively re-appraise) their emotional responses effectively over the course of 
four sessions (each spaced 2–5 days apart) in order to reduce self-reported negative 
affect and, under some conditions, also succeeded to experience less perceived stress 
in their daily lives. All of this was observed in the absence of any involvement of 
neuroscientific interventions. Indeed, it has been argued recently that re-appraisal can 
be a potent mechanism to enable workers to see through emotional repression at 
work, thereby setting the stage for their own emancipation from that repression 
(Lindebaum, 2017).  
Further to this, we underline that leader development interventions are not 
introduced into a social vacuum. For one thing, we note that those interventions which 
are contextually sensitive yield promising results (Bourbonnais, Brisson, & Vézina, 
2011). We note, in particular, that the context is made up of anything which surrounds 
the intervention – something that neuroscientific interventions cannot take into 
account. As others have underscored, “the social dimension of human existence 
presupposes context; neuroscientific methodology does not” (Frost & Lumia, 2012: 
464). This observation seems especially relevant in an era in which technology 
obfuscate concerns around the ‘context’ of interventions in the quest for immediate 
‘fixes’, often resulting into performative discourse and ultimately establishing new 
norms through practice. For another, we note that one-on-one sessions (such as 
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coaching) are more likely to succeed compared to computer-based delivery formats in 
enhancing key variables, such as resilience (Vanhove, Herian, Perez, Harms, & 
Lester, 2016). We argue, therefore, that future intervention should not be ‘blinded’ by 
the allure of neuroscience (Wastell & White 2012) and remain focused instead on 
psychological rather than physiological approaches to modify behavior. Relevantly, 
neuroscientists have advocated that practitioners could isolate the underlying placebo 
mechanisms, which may then offer the opportunity to forgo expensive and lengthy 
training sessions, while continuing to offer an effective non-pharmaceutical 
alternative. More specifically, it has been argued that if interacting with patients 
prompts positive outcomes, practitioners could invest more time in communicating 
prior to commencing neurofeedback (Thibault & Raz, in press). 
 
Teleology of ‘enhancement’ agenda in the workplace 
Our discussion of neuro-ethics prompts us to develop a critical awareness of 
neuroscience’s historical conditions of possibility. If a lead is taken from Habermas 
(1987), the real task of early positivism (in which neuroscience is embedded) has 
been to justify “sciences’ scientistic belief in themselves by constructing the history 
of the species as the history of the realization of the positive spirit” (p. 72)11. Quoting 
Comte, he adds that the aim of the positive spirit is “man’s actual influence on the 
external world” and to bring “about direct modification of the surrounding milieu” (p. 
72). These ideas – seen in the context of this essay – inspire the thought that, in the 
case of neuroscientific enhancement for example (as opposed to clinical applications), 
it is perhaps no longer the domination of the natural environment, but rather the direct 
                                                
11 For Habermas (1987), scientism “means science’s belief in itself; that is, the conviction that we can 
no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge 
with science” (p. 4). 
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domination of workers through technology that is at play. There is an interesting 
connection here with key tenets in critical theory, namely, its interest in the role of the 
natural science in the forces of production and a source of legitimation in society 
(Connerton, 1976). But in the 21st century and in many knowledge economies, the 
‘force of production’ is the individual employee, or the team of which he/she is a part 
(Osterman, Kochan, Locke, & Piore, 2001). Thus, the idea that we need to use 
neuroscience to ‘enhance’ our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors to function better at 
work reflects an aspiration toward performative knowledge (i.e., types of knowledge 
solely serving the purpose of economic efficiency, see Cabantous, Gond, Harding, & 
Learmonth, 2015)12.  
Related to this, the Historian Y. N. Harari noted recently (in Kuhn, 2015) that 
– in the next 100 years or so – the most significant revolution will be in the human 
condition itself (das Menschsein selbst). This is a central thesis, for irrespective of all 
historical changes in the past, the human condition served as a constant. We did not 
change; we possessed the same bodies and more or less identical physical and 
cognitive capacities over millennia. Harari (2014) worries that this constant is bound 
to change, and he refers to biotechnology, inter alia, as a manifestation of that 
imminent change towards a transhumanistic society. He writes: 
 
Perhaps in a few decades … genetic engineering and other forms of biological 
engineering [i.e., including neuroscience] might enable us to make far-
reaching alterations not only to our physiology … but also to our intellectual 
and emotional capacities (p. 403, italics added).  
 
If the domain of organizational neuroscience continues to grow and develop with the 
same speed and volume – and simultaneous lack of scrutiny on fundamental 
                                                
12 Note that this implies a significant passage from the early aspiration of positivism (and the scientists 
representing this tradition) to dominate the natural environment to the domination of human beings as 
such for particular (politcial) purposes.
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theoretical and methodological assumptions, it will imply that we become complicit 
in generating the very future that Harari cautions against.  
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHT 
In concluding our essay, we are partly sympathetic to Boyatzis’s (2014) view that 
“the field of neuroscience is rife with fascinating discoveries” even though “this is not 
neuro-magic” (p. 302). Given the evidence presented here and elsewhere, however, 
we would suggest paraphrasing that into “there is no neuro-magic, and applying 
neuroscience to leader development is rife with conceptual and methodological 
pitfalls”. So yes, the leader development community should care about neuro-ethics if 
the aim to prevent bad management practice is not more than mere lip service. To 
suggest that ethical concerns are ‘overstated’ in the application of neuroscience to 
management appears to flow more from dogmatic belief in scientism and adherence 
to cherished ideas - coupled with growing commercial interest – rather than from 
rigorous reasoning based upon evidence available.  
 
 	 26	
APPENDIX 
A brief primer on EEG - neurofeedback 
Neurofeedback is a self-regulation technique providing individuals with feedback 
about specific levels of (electrical) brain activity in conjunction with specific target 
behaviors. As reported in Thibault and Raz (in press, see Figure 1), the number of 
studies on EEG-nf has exponentially increased in the past 30 years. Neuroscientists 
generally assume that this type of feedback can help individuals “entrain, change, and 
regulate neural activity” (Thibault et al., 2016, p. 247). In providing more background 
on their approach to neurofeedback, Waldman and colleagues (2011) claim that 
neurofeedback training protocols can be designed which are akin to playing video 
games with one’s brain rather than one’s hands, and during which feedback is 
provided by rewarding targeted performance (a soothing sound) and sanctioning 
undesired brain patterns (an unpleasant sound). Correspondingly, neurofeedback 
“represents a form of operant conditioning . . . [where] the brain (unconsciously) 
learns to adapt to the desired patterns of performance. By repeating the process 
multiple times, the brain learns the desired pattern in response to a given stimulus, 
leading toward optimal functioning” (Waldman et al., 2011, p. 69). Interested readers 
can consult prior comprehensive review on the technicalities and processes associated 
with neurofeedback, especially but not limited to rigorous experimental designs to 
tease apart the effects of veritable vs sham feedback and the role of various control 
conditions (see, e.g., Thibault et al., 2016, esp. Figure 3).  
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